European Tribune

Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, nuclear energy and government

by Jerome a Paris
Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 07:07:49 AM EST

As we see news of the possible (and increasingly likely) bailout of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae by the US Treasury, I am reminded of something that I have been writing about nuclear energy, ie that it should be financed by the State, and I'd like to extend on why I think there are fascinating similarities between the two topics, however distinct they may seem.


My point about nuclear is that it is a capital intensive form of power generation, ie that the main component of the cost of the electricity produced is the long term amortisation (or financing) of the upfront investment. That means that the single most important driver of the cost of nuclear energy is the interest rate applied. In turn, that suggests that the easiest way to lower the cost of nuclear energy is to give it access to State funding, given how the State will always be the entity that has access to the lowest borrowing.

Well, the argument that led to the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the exact same: their purpose is to make funding available to the mortgage market by refinancing lending banks cheaply. The single most important driver of the ability to purchase a house (at a given price) is the interest rate that applies to the borrowing - for the same reason that the money need to be put up upfront and repaid over a very long period. Thus lower interest rates make housing more affordable, all others things being equal. And the reason that funding is cheaper when provided by Freddie or Fannie is because these are "Government-Sponsored Entreprises", ie they are seen as quasi-public entities (even though they are privately-owned) and they can thus raise funds at, or close to government rates, ie much cheaer than traditional banks. By giving a good chunk of the difference to homebuyers, it lowers the cost of purchase for them.

In both cases, government uses its innate financial strength (backed, ultimately, by its ability to (i) raise taxes or (ii) print money, ie in both cases to raise/capture money from its citizens) to support an industry by allowing it to reduce its main cost - and thus make a strategic good (housing or electricity) cheaper for the population.

This brings up several questions:

  • given that power generation is such a fundamentally important sector (everything in our lives depend on electricity; brownouts are totally unacceptable to the population and politicians rightly know it), why is public ownership of power generation seen as such a bad light (I know that the US has of local authority-owned and regulated utilities, but the general point stands). As a corollary, why is the idea of a State-owned nuclear plant company not supported in any meaningful way? Why is EDF, the French-owned utility that has pushed the nuclear model furthest, seen as a target to be broken up rather than a model to emulate?
  • why is government intervention in the power sector seen as an almost evil thing when the exact same kind of intervention in the financial sector is seen as desirable and normal?
  • more importantly, why is, en either case, no distinction made between the role of the government as financier of the sector, and its role as regulator of the sector?
As I wrote about State-owned nuclear plants, I'm sure that many objected not on the grounds of "socialism" or "government incompetence", but simply on grounds that there are other risks associated with nuclear: how to deal with the waste, how to manage safety, control of the uranium chain, single-point-of-failure in the grid, etc... and that these risks need to be dealt with as well. While I personally think that these risks can be managed because there are technical solutions and by having a strong regulator which enforces those solutions, I understand the arguments of those that say that governments - especially governments subject to the overwhelming influence of big corporations' lobbying and money - will not be able to properly do that job in a sustained way.

But the exact same point can be made about the mortgage industry (and banking more generally). There are other risks in that industry than mere access to liquidity, and other issues than the cost of funding. The current real estate bust proves that beyond any doubt: poorly regulated banks can do a lot of stupid things with other people's money, and entities with access (implicit or, as has now been made clear, explicit) to the government purse will do stupid things on an even larger scale, especially if they can personally profit along the way.

You should look at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a nuclear plant operator fully funded by the government and yet not regulated in any meaningful way in what it does with spent waste - and, of course, fully expecting that the government will pick up the tab of dealing with that waste.

Just like many could live with nuclear if the issue of waste were properly dealt with - and paid for, the exact same logic should apply to mortgage finance: the "waste" has to be dealt with - in that case, the waste being overly risky loans to customers that would not otherwise be touched without that possibility of dumping them on others. There is a reason subprime loans are now called "toxic waste" - that's exactly what they are. They are the logical, inevitable consequence of a financial system where liquidity was provided, without supervision, beyond the needs of acceptable customers and thus spilled into bad loans. Poor quality lending is the inevitable result of out-of-control lending bubbles. This is like telling nuclear plants to operate to the limit, for maximum profit, without any restriction of any kind, and in particular without having to worry about the spent fuel.

:: ::

Government that work properly provide carrots (cheap funding) and sticks (regulation of the underlying activity so that their noxious consequences are dealt with by the industry and not dumped on others). The finance industry has managed to grab the carrots while blocking the sticks. The nuclear industry is (more or less) under the stick, but has no access to the carrots.

In both cases, government is not properly doing its job. Of course, this is not because government is naturally incompetent, but because sustained ideological campaigns pushed for such results, for the benefits of very narrow groups: management creditors and (to a lesser extent) shareholders of financial institutions in one case, and the fossil fools and finance industry and in the other (the main result of current energy policies is the dominance of coal- and gas-fired power plants and the enrichment of the traders of gas, electricity and related infrastructure).

We need to make government able to do its job, which means using both the stick and the carrot. If you want cheap mortgages (a worthy goal of public policy), regulate the hell out of banks, and nationalize Freddie and Fannie; if you want cheap electricity, allow public funding of power plants (which, btw, will also heavily favor wind and other renewable energies) and make sure that all forms of generation are fully regulated for hteir externalities.

Instead, we're getting the worst of both worlds right now.

And the investor class might want to note that they are being wiped out right now in the financial sector, and that the most valuable utilities in Europe are nuclear-heavy (and State-controlled) EDF and GDF-Suez. Smart public policy makes sense even for capitalists.

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The same reasoning should be applied to all the sectors dealing with capital-intensive goods and services for which the market mechanisms do not produce optimal socio-economic results (i.e. including social and environmental externalities): common goods (energy, water...), financial services, rail transports, fundamental research, education...

However, it also requires a real democratic (i.e. multi-stakeholders') governance and control of the policies and systematic evaluation of their implementation. For years, in France, the nuclear energy policy was controlled by a small group of technocrats (a "state within the state") without any external control.

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 07:54:19 AM EST
two more remarks:
  • it need not be state-owned companies: it could be state-backed (for low interest rates) local authorities and/or multi-stakeholders co-operatives (like the Société Coopérative d'Intérêt Collectif)

  • for goods and services requiring huge capital investments upfront, like energy, we should be able to develop a European-wide public sector ("European-state"-owned).  


"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char
by Melanchthon on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 08:11:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I rate your remarks higher than "4".

Same with Jerome's article and Chris' comment. This is 'Think Tank' material.

Martin raises a good point, in that there would still be enough market influence in the mortgage business to quickly create corruption in the dealings between a government-owned financing agency and the retail establishments. Strong regulation would, of course, suppress this to some degree, but the tendency would always be there to seek and find new loopholes.

That's where approaches such as Chris' and Melancthon's are crucial. There has to be a decentralization and broadening of control over processes which affect large constituencies - e.g., housing. Nothing like local, involved citizenry to jealously guard their stock from large predators.

Jerome mentions local, quasi-governmental ownership of energy resources. He is probably thinking in terms of distribution (my part of WA state is almost exclusively PUDs [Public Utility Districts]). Our neighboring county's PUD has set up a private corporation with 3 other PUDs, under which they have financed wind turbine installations. They are already using and selling wind-generated energy, and very soon they will have US$2 billion in wind turbine assets in their county. Because they set up a private corporation, these assets are taxable property, and they receive full federal credits for the installations. The private corporation makes money for the PUDs, but the statutes that govern the PUDs limit the use of this money to the benefit of the PUD members (all of the residents who are serviced by the PUD) - left-over prairie populism/socialism from the early/middle part of the 20th century.

paul spencer

by paul spencer (spencerinthegorge AT yahoo DOT com) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 12:35:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The thing is that, in France, the deal for the elite was that it was largely unaccountable to the general public provided that there was an obvious focus in its actions on the public good (and there was a strong such ethos developed and nurtured in the public service), no personal enrichment, and a transparent selection process wherey the elite was highly meritocratic. There was a natural focus on infrastructure accessible to all.

That "deal" has broken down as French elites have been lured in increasing numbers to the corporate world - and finance in particular, and has very blatantly profited from the new deal, while clinging to their unaccountability.

But a technocratic aristocracy can - and did - work. Indeed, what works in France these days is, to a large extent, what was built by the previous generation of that elite.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 09:55:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree with you... to a certain extent. It is true that there was a strong such ethos in the public service (it still exists, notably at lower levels). But there are some caveats:

First, this kind of techno-aristocracy tends to be mainly monocultural (in that case from the Corps des Mines), which inevitably leads to groupthink and connivance. Also, lasting unaccountability leads to arrogance, information retention and sometimes, denial. A good example: they refused for a long time to acknowledge that France had been submitted to the Chernobyl fallout...

Second, regarding the meritocratic selection process, while partly true, there is an important socio-economic bias well analysed by Bourdieu and Passeron...

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 10:42:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
but the X-Mines are a lot more diverse group than the current crop of Inspecteurs des Finances, and they had a more effective internal policing system.

Chernobyl is not a good example: they were right on substance (there has been no meaningful impact of the Chernobyl cloud in France), but wrong on perceptions.

As to the meritocratic bit, it used to be true until not so long ago: you certainly had an overrepresentation of kids of X and of teachers, but you also had all the really bright kids from around the country, because the system did notice them and did push them even if their circumstances were not favorable. It's increasingly less the case, which is a pity (I saw a recent study which showed that X from the lower classes went down from 29% when I was there to under 10% today).

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 12:14:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I would be wary of calling the child of a teacher upper class.

Yes, my mother used to (she now sculpts) teach French and Latin. And I, like Jérôme, and like one of my brothers, went to Polytechnique.

Do I consider us as having had upper class upbringing? Not really. My father is a doctor, OK, but because he wanted to be purely ethical his practice took a while to make any money. Around when I was 8 there was a time when he was not even making enough to cover the repayment of the equipment. So we were 4, living on less than the salary of my mother, who had the lowest rank of teacher that you can have.

I got first-hand clothes for the first time around the age of 13. And I'm a first child.

So, upper class no (OK, they are upper middle-class NOW, but I have long finished my studies). But child of parents who valued achievements at school certainly.

Teachers are not very well paid. If their profession helps them helping their children succeed (not so much my personal case -my mother wasn't teaching us anything at home, just encouraging us to read, not that I needed much encouragement), I won't begrudge them. And I wouldn't call it class reproduction in a hurry.

Now, it's true that the system used to be better at identifying potential wherever it came from. I will always do my best to contribute to that, because it is a very worthy cause. I don't think it's necessarily lost forever, and in any case even as it is now, France is far, far from English speaking countries in the equality of its school system. In France, you CAN study while poor without being burdened by huge debts. I think the main problem is that real estate has shot up, and it's very hard to live close to good schools at the moment if you are not well off. This will in fact be made only worse by the Sarkozy push to remove the 'carte scolaire'.

"The womb that spawned that thing is fertile yet"

by Cyrille (cyrillev domain yahoo.fr) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 06:08:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And I wouldn't call it class reproduction in a hurry.

It is a subculture, it reproduces.

Of course, France's national ideology denies the existence of subcultures.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 06:46:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's more complex: you can't reduce the reproduction phenomenon to a question of upper/lower classes. Other factors intervene in the fact that there is a disproportionate number of teachers' children in French "grandes écoles":

First, social position comes not only from economic capital, but also from cultural capital (mastering of language, culture, knowledge of social codes, social skills, diplomas...), and social capital (social links, networks...) as well as symbolic capital which is institutional recognition. Teachers' (and doctors') children, even when they are not economically rich, usually have a much higher cultural capital as well as a stronger social capital than workers and low-level employees. Also, teacher and doctor are symbolically more valued in the collective representations of the social system.

Second, for teachers, there is an insider's advantage: they know quite well the functioning of the national educational system. Combined with their specific social capital (networks), this makes them able to help their children to find the best ways within the educational system.

That doesn't mean we have to blame them for that: they do their best as parents to help their children. But it explains why teachers' children are overrepresented at the top of the French educational system.

     

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 06:51:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I must add that self-confidence plays an important role in cultural capital, as well as in social capital building. You will find that a great number of workers and low-level employees lack self confidence for several reasons (feeling of failure at school, underachievement in their studies as well as in their professional career, being told by their teachers/bosses that hey will never achieve anything, being portrayed as losers by the dominant narrative...). This is, often unconsciously, transmitted to their children and these ones have to be very strong to overcome this liability.

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char
by Melanchthon on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 07:03:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, unless you demand total equality of outcome, there must be some factors behind the inequality.

If culture is a good indicator of success, I would say that is a desirable situation. Far more desirable than if it is parents' wealth. For example, you would be unlikely to see people with no culture, like Bush or Sarkozy, rising to the top (my inclusion of Sarkozy is also to show that I am afraid that culture is not the top factor in determining success even in France).

As for getting culture, well, the French system forces you to study many subjects for long (unlike A-level where you can take as few as 3 subjects). So if a child is a cultural sponge, he will be exposed to it and will have chance to absorb it. I sure have seen people from very humble backgrounds with a desire to learn. When they are children, they are the ones Jérôme was talking about when he said that the system used to identify bright kids everywhere.

I, personally, find it a very good thing when teacher's children are overrepresented at the top (except for the insider's argument. I don't know how much of an impact it has, my mother never ever used any network, but one case does not a statistic make). It means that positions may be earned rather than bought. It means that people chosing a career where they must care for others may sometimes benefit from it. It meast that opening the minds of your children may pay off.

One should not forget how you get in a Grande Ecole. It's a competitive exam, and anonymous. You can't convince teachers to make your child look good in return for contribution to the school. You can't get in because your parents got in, and so on. No system is perfect, but that one is fairer than most.

"The womb that spawned that thing is fertile yet"

by Cyrille (cyrillev domain yahoo.fr) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 07:13:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I didn't refer to culture as an indicator of success, but to cultural capital as a positive handicap for children coming from certain socio-economic categories.

Statistically, at birth, their is an equivalent number of "cultural sponges" or children "with a desire to learn" in every socio-economic category (unless you think the social structure is genetically determined). But children coming from workers or low-level employees backgrounds have much stronger cultural and social liabilities.

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 07:30:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
"Permanent revolution is the only solution."

Well - perhaps not, but sometimes it seems so.

paul spencer

by paul spencer (spencerinthegorge AT yahoo DOT com) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 12:38:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, in my view, real, participative/deliberative democracy is soft permanent revolution or "cold revolution" (hey, I should trademark this one!)

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char
by Melanchthon on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 01:36:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The arguments J presents here are very sound, especially as related to the business of power production and transmission.  An additional argument in favor of such a system is that the planning process and strategic decision-making regarding electricity is done most efficiently by a centralized authority with proper and active oversight.  Long-term investment is best handled by such process, especially as related to regional grids.

Skennah Kowa
by Crazy Horse on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 09:05:28 AM EST
TPTB, whether public or private, want very high ROI.  That means high profits very fast.  

And it's hard to conceive of something with a greater ROI than inventing a CDO and selling it to some chump.

by tjbuff (timhess@adelphia.net) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 10:11:36 AM EST
Fannie & Freddie were largely regulated. You don't get it much better. There subprime exposure is zero. Subprime is defined by not meeting the GSE standards. Paul Krugman e.g. defends the GSEs past lending completely.

E.g. F&F required 20% downpayment. The reason they are in trouble is the biggest bubble ever, which now eats up more than just 20% in case of a firesale.

Another problem is, that the borrowing of the gov will be more expensive, when taking F&F on its book. Your argument holds as long, as nobody expects the gov to default (and printing money directly is about the same). For a serious rating agency, counting money printing as default, the US would be in danger to loose AAA in the next years, when taking the full GSE debt.

But I dispute even the principal argument, that the gov should use its fiscal power to make mortgages cheaper. Built houses will become more expensive, if you have cheaper financing. That's a one of effect. As the housing stock is much larger, than the newly built houses and location is a dominant price determinant, I doubt, you get a lot of benefit for the general population. It is a subsidy for current owners of more housing stock, than they need.
Housing subsidies, especially tax deductibility of mortgage interest is probably among the drivers of the current mess.

Subsidising electricial production is much more equal. As electricial energy is consumed, not bunkered, you don't get an old user/new user bias. There public financing makes a lot more sense.

Lich King/Caribou Barbie 08
Pain brings Katharsis

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 11:04:48 AM EST
their micro behavior was regulated, as you note, but not

(i) their leverage, which was incredibly high (and beyond anythign tolerable for a bank)
(ii) their macro impact, which, by freeing capital for banks, allowed them to make more loans - and more aggressive ones.

So they kept the "safe" stuff, but on a highly leveraged basis (thus making themselves vulnerable to any down movement of the market), and allowed the bad stuff to proliferate on other banks' balance sheets (and then everywhere in the system thanks to MBS).

That's bad; bad, bad regulation, and they are a big part of the problem.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 12:09:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
They had different programs, including 10% down and 5% down with an additional, financed cost for MPI (Mortgage Premium Insurance, or something like that). In addition they were not regulated well enough to prevent all kinds of NINJA loans via outright lying.

paul spencer
by paul spencer (spencerinthegorge AT yahoo DOT com) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 12:46:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
When your biggest local real estate markets, such as Los Angeles Arizona and South Florida suffer declines of 30% in value and every loan made since 2004 is under water, there is no way for the whole system not to take a big bath. Loans have been packaged, those packages have been divided into various tranches and sold off as CDOs.  For purposes of origination liability, it is too late.  The only quick resolution is to write down the loans to current market value, but the organizations suffering the write downs have no direct relation to those originating the loans.

All who were involved should be treated by the same laws that would apply to those in receivership of properties obtained through fraudulent conveyance.  The personal wealth of all who profited from this process, from Greenspan and the CEOs of Morgan, Citi, etc. down to the lowliest mortgage broker, should acquire a new debt in proportion to the damage caused by their collective actions.  That debt should have the same status in law as credit card debt.

Of course that will never happen.  Not at least until the whole system of campaign finance has been reformed.  Until that happens, what has happened should be what is expected to happen again.  Why not?  Very few paid any real price for their actions.  As the magnitude of the disaster continues to unfold there may be more support for true reform.  Until that happens....

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 12:46:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
When your biggest local real estate markets, such as Los Angeles Arizona and South Florida suffer declines of 30% in value and every loan made since 2004 is under water, there is no way for the whole system not to take a big bath.

The inverse pyramid of Credit which inflated property prices is held up by a base of Capital of "Credit Institutions". In recent years, through securitisation, credit derivatives, credit insurance and combinations thereof this Capital base has increased massively through being "outsourced" to Investors. The pyramid of Credit increased commensurately as a consequence, and the "Mother of All Bubbles" is the result.

Since the point of "Peak Credit" last year, defaults have been eating away rapidly at this Capital base. New Capital is both sparse and expensive, so that capital outsourcing no longer occurs, the cost of Capital for credit institutions is sharply higher and what they charge for credit is much higher. What all this means in practice is that new credit is not available to support anything more than the level of property prices that maintained at a time when credit institutions made prudent loans (eg low loan to income, and maybe 20% deposit). ie the 1970's or even earlier.

Lower Central Bank rates of interest are almost irrelevant as a "fix", since the problem lies in the borrowers' inability to repay the Loan Principal. Over a period of years, Banks will maintain high rates to customers using the lower Central Bank rates to increase their margins and slooowly rebuild their Capital base.

I would guess that reversion to a 1970's style (or earlier) Capital Base and regime will mean, in the US at least, anything between a 50% to 70% fall in property prices, and more in some places. This fall will occur once jobs really start to disappear, when even current reduced rental values and property prices become "unaffordable", and defaults go through the roof reducing Capital still further.

The cause of the forthcoming recession/depression is that the credit = money necessary for economic activity will not be deployed in productive activity but will be used to replace the money literally destroyed in defaults.

There is no way to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Our deficit-based economy is finally finished, courtesy of the need for literally trillions of dollars worth of new Capital/ "Equity". We have Greenspan to thank for bringing the inevitable forward by a few years.

However, I believe that it is possible to approach the problem from the other end of the telescope and to recapitalise and reconfigure the system by reinventing "Equity" and indeed, "Capital" itself.

We may achieve this through extending by changing the form of Capital through the use of new legal frameworks, replacing the sociopathic "Corporation" with partnership and trust based alternatives, and replacing conventional "Shares" with new types of "Units".

Units redeemable against value such as energy or rental value are capable, I believe, of becoming the new forms of "asset-based" currency necessary, and exchangeable within a networked "International Clearing Union" similar to that proposed bY Keynes at Bretton Woods.

What is needed IMHO is to redefine "Equity" through a process of "Unitisation" and to execute a "Debt/Equity Swap" on a national and indeed international scale.

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 04:15:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The cause of the forthcoming recession/depression is that the credit = money necessary for economic activity will not be deployed in productive activity but will be used to replace the money literally destroyed in defaults.

That is the most maddening aspect of our current debacle.  All efforts at present are directed towards preventing the inevitable losses to those who are most responsible for the problem.  It is the most egregious example of which I am aware of throwing good money after bad.  Well, to the extent to which there is any "good money" left in existence.

That response is entirely due to the nature of existing campaign finance.  The authors of this disaster are still the dominant contributors to the process, so their interests will be protected first.  The US government will suck dry all available wealth from those unable to protect themselves in a failed effort to save the un-savable.   What a miserable bunch of dummies we all are.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 03:06:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
All who were involved should be treated by the same laws that would apply to those in receivership of properties obtained through fraudulent conveyance.

Ain't that the truth.

The problem, of course, as you point out is that

the organizations suffering the write downs have no direct relation to those originating the loans

not to speak of the mortgage brokerages which negotiated the mortgages and which no longer exist.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 04:58:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Housing loans also have a huge subsidy on the income tax side. Since mortgage interest is deductable, and since at the start of a mortgage almost all of the payment is interest, you get a 20% or so--depending on tax bracket--handout. The result of this is the destruction of the rental marketplace, where only the people who are so abjectly poor (i.e. no regular job at all) are customers.

Similarly, government support for nuclear power reduces the marginal cost of new energy sources. We would be better off if the current subsidies for oil and nuclear power were eliminated.

by asdf on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 09:12:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Do you know details? It seems to me, that mortgage interest payment deductability is an incentive never to pay down the principal. I don't know about taxation of stock gains in the US, but if there would be similar rules as are in place up to this year in Germany, with this interest deductability it would be reasonable never to pay down, but instead buying stocks.
One can call this speculating with borrowed money. A frame of laws, which incentives this is not exactly what I would call reasonable...

Or is "and since at the start of a mortgage almost all of the payment is interest," a sign, that there are still good reasons to pay down?

Lich King/Caribou Barbie 08
Pain brings Katharsis

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 12:35:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think asdf is referring to a standard repayment mortgage, where each month's payment contains an element to pay off interest and another to pay off principal with the relative ratios of the interest-element and the principal-element gradually changing as you progress through the lifetime of the instrument - ie. practically 100% interest-element at the start to practically 100% principal-element at the end.

If you have an interest-only mortgage, then this incentive does indeed exist (assuming that interest-only loans are tax-deductible of course - I don't know what the situation is Stateside, but the UK no longer gives tax relief for any kind of mortgage interest). It's balanced by the need to have a chunk of ready cash available to pay off the principal at the point  when the mortgage reaches term of course.

Regards
Luke

-- #include witty_sig.h

by silburnl on Fri Aug 22nd, 2008 at 10:44:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, thank you, that was the case I was referring to.

Over here, most mortgages are fixed payment for the entire term, typically 30 years. "Creative" mortgages have all sorts of variations, including several types where your payment can balloon up after a few years. These tend to be the ones that get people into trouble.

by asdf on Sat Aug 23rd, 2008 at 09:45:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Excellent Diary.

Credit is necessary to create productive assets, such as houses, and nuclear power stations.

The former produces a stream of property rental value units (eg Square Metre Years); the latter produces a stream of energy value units (eg Mega Watt Hours) and both Units have a value in exchange.

Credit, whether created by a State's Treasury; by a State's Central Bank; or by a Private Bank, costs nothing to create. The economic value provided by all credit intermediaries, whether Public or Private, in fact lies in the implicit guarantee of borrowers' credit. The cost of this implicit guarantee provision is essentially system operating costs, and the cost of defaults.

Taxation could fund any operating costs and losses from credit creation directly by a Treasury. Interest paid by borrowers funds the costs of Central or Private bank credit creation. The only difference between credit created by a State or Central Bank and that created by a Private bank is that the latter aims to obtain a profit above its costs.

The problems arise when credit is created to acquire pre-existing assets, particularly land.  Such secured credit is the cause of asset price inflation, and "cheap mortgages" when applied to pre-existing housing, rather than to creating new ones, would IMHO be extremely undesirable.

Over a period of seven years now I have become convinced that it is possible to create a new "enterprise model" or legal and financial structure which is neither Public = "State" owned nor "Private" = owned by a "Corporation" but a new "Not for Loss"  synthesis based not on Company law but upon Trust and Partnership law.

I believe that the solution to the "Credit Crunch" for long term financing of "Capital Investment" lies not in secured debt financing but in new forms of "Public Equity" within such new types of investment framework. While it may be conventional, it is neither necessary nor efficient for Governments to borrow to invest in the long term.

The result could be to effectively monetise the use value of productive assets such as housing and energy plants through the creation of new forms of "Equity" investment in future production. This technique is extremely problematic for non-renewable energy investment, since selling production forward (and monetising it) is not a great idea if your fuel prices are subject to increase.

Fuel costs may also become something of an issue with nuclear eventually, especially if large numbers of new stations compete for Uranium. The other issue with monetising nuclear energy is of course the uncertain cost of decommissioning.

Renewables - and particularly energy efficiency savings, are a different issue, because their fuel costs are zero, and the operating costs are either minimal or in the case of savings, zero.

I recommend:

(a) monetising renewable energy through the use of "Energy Pool" frameworks and funded by levies on carbon-based energy use;

(b) monetising land and property rentals through the refinancing of existing secured debt.

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 11:04:49 AM EST
Thanx for a good article. Articles such as this are the reason that eurotrib is on my daily reading list. I want to point out that Fannie and Freddie wrapped and also held a large quantity of Alt-A, although Fannie has recently stopped the practise http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ac.pGKwsRx5k

You point out that the regulation and reward system for both the housing and nuclear industries have failed in the USA. Would you have any specific recommendations to help the situation ?

sidd

by sidd on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 01:17:33 PM EST
Well, the carrot is fine for mortgages, but the stick (which used to exist) was dismantled.

The stick mostly works for nuclear (I persoanlly believe that regulation is tough enough) but the carrot has not been used. Low cost funding for all energy investments could be put on the table. It would be 'market neutral' but would massively favor wind and nukes.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Aug 20th, 2008 at 02:51:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Does the government has to be an active investor, a dynamic participant in services' and job market, or emphatically not? Are modern governments trying unnaturally hard to keep "free markets" sterile from own influence? Can this attitude be really called "laissez-faire"?

Private entrepreneurship might be indeed better than each public service, but so what?! Let private companies provide premium services and win, but what is wrong with "inferior" government services that are not actually costly and provide some minimal standards and sensible continuity? Is competition from government-owned (or sponsored) institutions a really unfair involvement? What if government's position to stay away from investments (and, say, job market) is much too convenient to some special interests, at significant expense for most of other people?

For example, worker's wages are declining rather unfairly - employers offer just as much pay as they are compelled, leaving to themselves greatest share of business bounty possible. Wouldn't it be an elegant solution to declining wages if the government, instead of regulation, would offer jobs at some decent standard of wages, pushing the  private sector offer fair wages as well?

Government activity does not have to be the most important factor in economy growth. But earnest elimination of government's role affects social balance, and might be removing some vital salt and spice from economy's and society's body, essential for long term health.

by das monde on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 01:01:46 AM EST
It's rather simple, given who owns the government...privatize the profits, socialize the costs.

The standard anglo-saxon model when it comes right down to it, as the US and UK treatment of the bank bailouts will prove to be (as they virtually always have been).

"C'est un scandale !"

by redstar on Thu Aug 21st, 2008 at 05:54:37 AM EST


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